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Official/ Unofficial: Information Management 
and Social Association 
Kay Hearn 
Abstract: This paper explores the debates around civil society and cor-
poratism as ways of understanding changes in social association, includ-
ing non-governmental organisations and protest groups, and information 
management in relation to the development of the Internet. Both con-
cepts have been used to examine the changes that have taken place since 
the implementation of the Open Door Policy and more recently the 
development of the Internet, and have shed light on the way in which 
new forms of social association operate, and on their relationship to the 
government. However, both concepts tend to be deterministic and re-
ductionist positions. Instead, I use a centre-margin analysis based on 
medium theory to explore the relationship between the state and society 
as a way of shedding light on the interaction between the government 
and NGOs and on how the state manages the flow of information in 
order to shape public discourse.  
  Manuscript received 25 October 2009; accepted 13 June 2010 
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Introduction 
The Internet and the development of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) have enabled the formation of associations of people around a 
myriad of interests. At the end of 2006 there were an estimated 354,000 
NGOs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) according to China’s 
Ministry of Civil Affairs. However, according to Jia Xijin, an associate 
professor at the School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua 
University, the real figure was likely more than one million (2007). Alter-
natively, corporatism and bureaucratic authoritarianism have been used 
to analyse the way NGOs are managed by the state. The Internet has 
enabled many groups to organise and to exchange ideas, and these de-
velopments are often pointed to as the beginnings of a civil society, a 
prerequisite for democracy. This paper looks at the concepts of civil 
society and the public sphere and the way that official and unofficial 
discourses such as public debate are managed. It is my contention that 
the concepts of civil society and the public sphere are inadequate for 
understanding the way in which informational flows are managed as a 
consequence of the development of the Internet. I will begin by looking 
at the concept of civil society and its application to the opening of the 
economy and the Internet in China. Alternatively I use a centre-margin 
analysis, based on medium theory, to explore the power relationships 
that are negotiated between the party and social organisations and pro-
vincial and local governments to argue that public discourse and infor-
mational flows are managed via the Internet. I also argue that the Inter-
net serves as a window to the activities of provincial and local govern-
ments and as a window to public opinion. As a way of supporting my 
claims I will then look at the way official discourses are managed through 
NGOs, specifically those that concentrate on the environment and 
HIV/ AIDS. I will confine my discussion to the overall management of 
environmental and HIV/ AIDS NGOs. Because there are so many of 
these groups, it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate them in 
depth. I will then contrast the official discourses with the unofficial dis-
courses in the context of the way a particular event was reported on (the 
Huaxi/ Huankantao riots that occurred in response to pollution), and 
the reporting on an HIV/ AIDS activist and her blog in the PRC.  
The Internet has been effectively managed by the Chinese govern-
ment through the development of content, legislation and the code used 
to construct the architecture of the Internet commonly known as the 
“Great Firewall”. By “architecture” I mean the technological means to 




build the Internet, including both the hardware and the software. Law-
rence Lessig (2006) argues that “code is law” and by this he means the 
way in which code is used to regulate behaviour. An example of code 
being used to regulate access would be the use of passwords to access e-
mail or banking information. In China, where information has been sub-
ject to tight control and suppression, there is, I would argue, an emerging 
understanding that information management and spin is more likely to 
succeed than suppression. I aim to look at the way that the Internet (as it 
is viewed in Mainland China) is shaped by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) and how resistance is articulated and silenced or incorporated into 
existing discourses. More broadly, the Internet only empowers certain 
groups within society because it suits the CCP. When an event occurs 
that can be used by the party to advance a particular ideology, the Inter-
net is allowed to empower society. When an event runs contrary to the 
CCP line, such as the riots in Lhasa, Tibet, in 2008, there is a crackdown 
and a public relations/ propaganda offensive follows. The CCP clearly 
has clear control over the “social pool of information”. Though the 
Internet has enabled Chinese citizens to participate in a new form of 
public life, there is still no space in which dissent is allowed. As far as the 
Internet is concerned, the CCP has sought to maintain its authority over 
“what is known” through the development of content and through the 
code used to construct the architecture of the Internet. Code is also used 
to develop content.  
The Internet acts as a tool of policy dissemination and a window 
onto public opinion and social activism in a wide variety of forms. The 
Internet is a point at which many competing interests can be observed, 
by either the central government or researchers. My analysis is based on 
medium theory; in particular I draw upon the work of Harold Innis 
(1951, 1952, 1972), as this allows for a centre-margin approach to look at 
the ways in which power relationships and policy implementation are 
negotiated. Spatial relationships involve the negotiation and interplay 
between central authorities and policy-makers in Beijing and provincial 
governments as sites of policy implementation at the provincial margins. 
A centre-margin approach also allows a structure for analysing the inter-
play between social actors such as NGOs and special interest groups that 
arise in response to an issue or event. The case studies illustrate the ways 
in which these relationships are negotiated. There is interplay between 
official and unofficial discourses that can be observed via the Internet. 
The Internet acts as a window onto all kinds of activity, official and un-
  214 Kay Hearn 
 
official, and the way it is managed sheds light on the way politics vis-à-
vis social association and broader civic participation is managed. There is 
a lot of negotiation between social and political actors in China.  
Civil Society and the Public Sphere 
The formation of NGOs and the networking capabilities of the Internet 
in China are often given as evidence of the beginnings of a “civil society” 
and an emerging public sphere, and both of these are seen as fundamen-
tal preconditions for democracy. The discourse in China on the concept 
of civil society has led to a reinterpretation of Marxism by Chinese 
scholars (Ma 2005: 22). Indeed, much of the scholarship concerning the 
Internet in China uses theories of civil society as a framework – theories 
influenced by Habermas’ notion of the public sphere and civil society 
inside and outside of China (Tai 2006; Wu 2006; Yang 2003a, 2003b; 
Zhou 2006). In general the arguments here are that the Internet is pro-
viding the means to transform China’s political culture from the bottom 
up through the creation of a space in which groups can form and have 
the potential to influence the government. It is in this sense that the 
Internet is seen as a public sphere that is a democratising force. Wu uses 
the notion of public sphere to explain the emergence of a non-official 
ideology of nationalism that is articulated on the Internet in China. Guo-
bin Yang argues that the Internet and civil society form a nexus of mu-
tual benefit. He states that  
the Internet facilitates civil society activities by offering new possibili-
ties for citizen participation. Civil society facilitates the development 
of the Internet by providing the necessary social basis – citizens and 
citizen groups – for communication and interaction (Yang 2003a).  
These notions of civil society and the public sphere are closely associated 
with the work of Jürgen Habermas, who looked at the formation and 
articulation of public opinion and debates in 18th-century Western 
Europe. Habermas wrote that  
by ‘the public sphere’ we mean first of all a realm of our social life in 
which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access 
is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into 
being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to 
form a public body (Habermas 1974).  




Habermas traced the materialisation, transformation and collapse of the 
public sphere back to a highly commercialised mass media that reshaped 
and confined political discussion to the media. According to Habermas, 
public opinion was previously formed through face-to-face discussions 
in coffee-houses over newspapers; now the articulation of public opinion 
and discussion is confined to the media itself.  
Definitions of civil society are much more hotly contested: Most 
definitions de-emphasise power relationships that are embedded in the 
potential formation of civil society groups in authoritarian countries, 
where these groups are only allowed to exist with government sponsor-
ship, legal or financial. A broad definition of civil society based on vol-
untary associations de-emphasises the political nature of the interactions 
of these groups and fails to account for the inherent inequality in these 
interactions. The definitions based on voluntary associations are too 
broad, as these could include sporting clubs and groups outside the law 
such as triads or gangs (Ehrenberg 1999: 235-236; Rodan 2003a: 506). 
The problem with civil society is that it diffuses attention away from the 
unequal power relationships inherent in all political interactions, regard-
less of whether these groups are actually able to influence the govern-
ment. The concept of civil society is deterministic in its assumptions 
about the ability of people to organise associations and the inevitability 
of a form of pluralistic democracy in that it overlooks the restrictions 
and regulations that are placed on the formation of associations, particu-
larly in authoritarian countries such as China. The tracing of centre-
margin relationships provides a better framework for negotiations of 
influence and power as it assumes that these contests are unequal from 
the start and that they are under constant arbitration, resulting in wins 
and losses on each side. 
Yang Guobin (2003b) argues that the Internet has helped to estab-
lish the beginnings of a civil society in China and points to growth in 
voluntary organisations that are beyond the reach of the government as 
evidence of the emergence of a civil society. Many of these groups how-
ever are unable to register with the government, and that limits their 
influence. To some degree the inability to register also has the potential 
to impair mobilisation because unregistered groups can be made illegal at 
any time and forced to cease their activities or move their operations 
underground. Unregistered groups may lack legitimacy in the eyes of the 
state – which marginalises them and their activities – even though these 
groups only exist because the government has allowed it. The Falun 
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Gong case and the ongoing campaigns to prevent their re-establishment 
make it abundantly clear that if the government wishes to ban an organi-
sation and remove it from the “public sphere”, it is quite capable of do-
ing so. The degree to which unregistered groups are able to forge links 
(guangxi ??) with the government is unclear, a fact which may prevent 
an accurate evaluation of the effectiveness of these groups.  
White, Howell and Shang, using a sociological approach, argue that 
there is an emerging civil society in China, and they are cautious in the 
way they use the term “civil society”, citing many of its limitations. Even 
though there is a high degree of regulation among groups recognised by 
the government, White et al. describe the situation as a “piebald civil 
society” because there are groups that operate outside government regu-
lation. The authors cite four types of groups: the caged, the incorporated, 
the extra-government, and the suppressed. The caged include party or-
ganisations such as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the 
Communist Youth League and the All-China Women’s Federation. The 
incorporated include NGOs and GONGOs (government-operated non-
governmental organisations) and finally the groups in limbo, outside of 
government regulation. The groups outside of the government are those 
groups lacking formal recognition and those groups that have obtained 
official recognition through the patronage of an official agency or indi-
vidual. White et al. write that  
each of these categories of social organisation embodies, to varying 
degrees, the characteristics of associational qualities of ‘civil society’. 
This partial and piebald ‘civil society’ is made up of a complex and 
rapidly changing social constellation with many layers and many dif-
ferent types of relationship between them and the state (White, How-
ell, and Shang 2003: 282).  
White et al. also argues there are various layers to this process of incor-
poration and repression of different social organisations. Howell (2007) 
argues that civil association in China had passed the point of no return: 
She believes there are multiple civil societies and that the corporatist 
model is insufficient as the number of social associations has spread and 
is beyond the control of the party/ state, however she concedes that 
there is repression of groups perceived as critical of the government. 
What this spectrum and position overlook is the interaction between 
different levels of the government itself in the form of local interests that 
are interwoven with the opening of spaces of political discourse via so-
cial organisations. There is an assumption that the state in this process is 




monolithic and has homogeneous interests across the nation. Quite 
clearly this is not the case. The Internet adds another layer of complexity 
to the mix in that it acts as both a window onto the activities of social 
groups and as a window onto the activities of provincial and local gov-
ernments. In this sense, while it allows a new space of social interaction, 
it also provides a site in which social interactions can be more closely 
monitored. This is akin to the arguments made by Boyle (1997) about 
the Internet as a remote and electronic panopticon. 
In terms of using the Internet as the basis for a civil society, the 
CCP has sought to manage the flow of information to prevent the for-
mation of groups that would seriously challenge their role and political 
authority. The argument I make here is similar to the one made by Ro-
dan (2003b) in relation to Singapore, whose government has also been 
very successful at preventing the formation of an effective opposition to 
the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP). This, according to Rodan 
(2003b), is the objective of media controls in Singapore. An example of 
this would be the effectiveness of the shutting down and limiting access 
to the Internet in Xinjiang following the Wulumuqi riots in July 2009.  
Since 1978 groups in China have emerged and formed independ-
ently of the government, and to some degree they are autonomous. 
However, the degree to which they are regulated by the CCP means that 
they are managed and shaped to conform to the CCP’s monopolistic 
knowledge and view. In addition, many registered NGOs cultivate state 
relationships as a means of sustaining their operations. Ma writes that 
ironically NGOs have tried to become more independent by holding 
on to their relationships with the government […]. [They] often have 
to rely on government’s authority to increase the size and influence of 
their projects (Ma 2005: 97).  
The problem with the application of the concept of civil society and the 
public sphere is that it fails to adequately acknowledge the power rela-
tionships embedded within these institutional arrangements. This is not 
to say that the way power in China is exercised by the CCP is totalising 
and that there is no room for civic participation. Nor does it imply that 
these groups are not the creation and visualisation of new spheres of 
influence outside of the party. However, there are limits to what can be 
said, and clearly the CCP still define those boundaries. The application of 
civil society overstates the ability of these groups to potentially challenge 
the government.  
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In some ways the formation and regulation of NGOs is more con-
sistent with development theories of state corporatism or corporatism 
and bureaucratic authoritarianism. Ma (2005) argues that since the emer-
gence of NGOs in the mid-1990s, the function of civil associations has 
evolved along both civil society and state corporatist lines. This model 
acknowledges the kinds of relationships that are shared by the state and 
NGOs in China. In a corporatist system, the state usually channels the 
interests of a group into a single organisation. Unger and Chan argue 
that  
the state determines which organizations will be recognized as legiti-
mate and forms an unequal partnership of sorts with such organiza-
tions. The associations sometimes even get channelled into the policy-
making processes and often help implement state policy on the gov-
ernment’s behalf (Unger and Chan 1995: 30). 
The corporatist model is likened to the fascist states of the 1930s, where 
business and labour interests were subordinate to the state. Japan, South 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan have all been described as corporatist in 
earlier stages of their development.  
The strategy outlined above by Rodan is much the same as in the 
PRC, and this is not surprising as China has often looked to Singapore 
for models of development and containment of informational flows on 
the Internet. In terms of the development of civil society and the limits 
of autonomy of civic association, it is the CCP that still defines the limits 
of any public discourse and they alone remain the final arbiters of what 
can and cannot be said. While the political process has opened up to 
some degree, there are clear limits on expression. In order to remain in 
the market, the hosts of websites, blogs, online games, Bulletin Board 
Systems (BBSs), and chat rooms all conform to the boundaries set by the 
CCP. In the case of voluntary and autonomous association this is still 
largely dictated by the CCP. For example, there are no trade unions that 
are independent of the government. The corporatist model better ex-
plains the CCP’s attempts to manage informational flows. Unger and 
Chan write that  
harmony is the catchword of a corporatist system, regardless of 
whether this harmony is truly consensual or imposed from above. 
And it is very often a goal-oriented harmony, orchestrated to serve a 
national mission (Unger and Chan 1995: 32). 




Hu Jintao’s concept of “social harmony” echoes Unger and Chan’s sen-
timents, and the formation of NGOs and their function in Chinese soci-
ety as defined by the CCP is to support “social harmony”. 
The qualification that Ma (2005) makes in her argument about the 
formation of civil associations and NGOs being consistent with both 
civil society and corporatist lines allows for an account of CCP manage-
ment and power relationships, as well as an acknowledgement of the 
emerging influence and role that these groups play in Chinese society. 
Ma writes: 
The experience of Chinese associations indicates that the state has 
generated mechanisms for adopting profound economic and social 
structural changes in corporatist relations the state stills holds control. 
At the same time, associations, bottom-up ones in particular, are rais-
ing their voices in the implementation and even in the making of pol-
icy; there are clear indications that civil society is evolving (Ma 2005: 
137). 
Ma’s fusing of civil society and corporatism is similar to Innis’s notions 
of centre-margin relationships, and the negotiation of a monopoly of 
knowledge and the management of time and space. Ma argues that this 
approach provides a better explanation of the ways in which the CCP 
has sought to manage and contain NGOs from the top down, while at 
the same time she explains the impact and formation of NGOs from the 
ground up. 
The centre-margin approach I argue for is similar to the “frag-
mented authoritarian” approach advocated by Andrew Mertha. He ar-
gues that China has become more pluralistic in terms of policy formula-
tion and implementation despite remaining an authoritarian state: 
The ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (FA) framework, first proposed in 
1988, has remained the most durable heuristic through which to study 
Chinese politics. It asserts that policy made at the center becomes in-
creasingly malleable to the parochial organizational and political goals 
of various vertical agencies and spatial regions charged with enforcing 
that policy. Outcomes are shaped by the incorporation of interests of 
the implementation agencies into the policy itself. FA thus explains 
the policy process as being governed by incremental change via bu-
reaucratic bargaining (Mertha 2009: 996). 
Mertha argues that the Chinese state is increasingly responsive to the 
demands of society. He writes that  
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the rules of the policy-making process are still captured by the frag-
mented authoritarianism framework, but that the process has become 
increasingly pluralized: Barriers to entry have been lowered, at least 
for certain actors (hitherto peripheral officials, non-governmental or-
ganizations and the media) (Mertha 2009: 995).  
Small Government, Big Society 
The government encouraged the formation of NGOs and Non-Profit 
Organisations (NPOs) in reaction to some of the consequences of the 
Open Door Policy and reforms that were begun in 1978 under the slo-
gan “Small Government, Big Society”. Some reasons the NGOs were 
promoted were to help fill the gap that was left in welfare services after 
the iron rice bowl1 was rolled back, and to help with response to disaster 
relief. NGOs have also been useful to the government in the develop-
ment of the economy. Ma says that  
the government believes that the resources, development program 
and services brought in or provided by the non-governmental sector, 
domestic or international, will help the CCP restore its legitimacy, re-
duce public pressure on the government, and bring social stability (Ma 
2005: 47).  
At the same time, the CCP sought to manage NGOs through registra-
tion and regulation under the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Another role of 
NGOs in China is to act as a conduit for discontent and for directing 
complaints through official channels. In the case of environmental 
groups, their function has been to steer victims of pollution through the 
courts to prevent their rioting in the streets.  
Twenty years after the launch of the Open Door Policy, China 
sought to develop a legal structure to deal with social organisations 
(SOs), and in 1998 the first regulations aimed at this sector were intro-
duced (Ma 2005: 76). Ma argues that  
the current state of Chinese NGOs is shaped by the present political 
culture, the party-state’s continuing intervention in the private sector, 
and the mixed influences of Western ideas and traditional Chinese 
thoughts (Ma 2005: 77).  
                                                 
1 The iron rice bowl (tiefanwan ???) refers to the work unit system of lifetime 
employment that guaranteed housing and other benefits through employment in 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The reforming of the economy has effectively 
ended this system. 




The official CCP NGO policy is one of “nourishment, development, 
supervision, [and] regulation” (peiyu, fazhan, jiandu, guanli, ??,??,??,
??) (Ma 2005: 69).  
Good examples of how the government limits civic participation by 
NGOs are the closures of the online journal China Development Brief and 
the civil society journal Minjian (Popular) in November 2007. Minjian was 
published under the sponsorship of the Social and Citizenship Devel-
opment Research Center of Zhongshan University in Guangzhou. Min-
jian’s publication license was withdrawn by the news-publishing bureau 
of the municipal government of Guangzhou in July 2007 (Radio Free Asia 
2007). 
The closures highlighted the precarious legal position of NGO pub-
lications. The journals had been operating without a publishing license 
(kanhao ??), and this was the legal justification for the closure. How-
ever, thousands of NGOs run publications without licenses.  
In China all licenses for publishing are held by sponsoring institu-
tions, or zhuguan danwei (????), that are responsible for ensuring 
party propaganda discipline at publications under their watch (Ban-
durski 2007). 
Minjian’s editor, Zhai Minglei, stated that 
all of the internal organizational publications and materials of NGOs 
in China are illegal publications […] [a]nd so it is with all of those 
small booklets we circulate among friends and acquaintances in China 
as a form of interaction or to seek the appreciation of friends, or 
those various poetry collections we call people’s publications (??), 
all reading materials shared among colleagues. All they need is to be 
printed and they are illegal publications (Bandurski 2007).  
Zhai turned to his blog after the magazine was closed; his home was 
raided by the police and his hard drive confiscated.  
In another incident in November 2007, a website aimed at provid-
ing information and contact assistance for those with Hepatitis B was 
closed after six years of operation without any meddling from the gov-
ernment (Radio Free Asia 2007). The website was owned by an NGO, 
and the closure followed the reclassification of the site as a healthcare 
service provider. The site’s forums were removed after recommenda-
tions were made by the Ministry of Health (Radio Free Asia 2007). Again, 
this illustrates the ability of the government to silence critics. 
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Environmental NGOs 
The state of China’s environment is one of the most serious problems 
facing the country today, and the CCP widely promoted the Beijing 
Olympics as the “green” Olympics. In 2006 Zhu Guangyao, Deputy 
Chief of the State Environmental Protection Agency, put the cost of 
environmental damage at 200 billion USD, 10 per cent of the country’s 
GDP (China Daily 2006). The environment was also identified as a prob-
lem by Hu Jintao (2007a) in his report at the Seventeenth National Con-
gress of the Communist Party of China on October 15, 2007. The dam-
age to China’s environment is now seen as a serious threat to economic 
growth as well as a consequence of that growth and development. In 
1998 the government launched the “Three Green Project” to develop 
what it called a “green market” to promote green consumption (Zhang 
2007a). Pan Yue, Vice Minister of the State Environmental Protection 
Administration, stated that “the ultimate force to solve China’s environ-
mental problems lies in the public, or in another word, every ordinary 
people [sic]. Chinese people are approaching the absolute green con-
sumption step by step” in an article that promoted the use of NGOs in 
solving China’s environmental crisis (Zhang 2007a). 
A large number of NGOs have formed around the environment, 
and in June 2007 the All-China Environment Federation claimed that 
there were 2,770 environmental NGOs (Zhang 2007b). Despite the offi-
cial numbers, most NGOs are underdeveloped and many more remain 
unregistered. Given this I will briefly outline the ways in which the larg-
est and most influential environmental NGOs are promoted and man-
aged by the government.  
The oldest and most influential environmental organisation is 
Friends of Nature (FoN), the first NGO to register with the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs, in 1994. Global Village Beijing (GVB) is another influential 
environmental group, and both are located in Beijing. Both of these 
groups run educational programs and are active in developing smaller 
NGOs throughout the country. The leaders of FoN and GVB, Liang 
Congjie and Liao Xiaoyi, respectively, were both appointed to the Beijing 
Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG).  
In 2005 the All-China Environment Federation was established and 
promoted by the government. At the opening ceremony for the federa-
tion, China’s Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan said that he “encouraged the 
federation to further study the major ecological problems and offer bet-
ter consultation to government decision-makers” (People’s Daily 2005). In 




October 2006 China’s environmental NGOs were called upon by Zhu 
Guangyao, the deputy head of the State Environmental Protection 
Agency, “to play a bigger role in promoting supervising environment 
protection” (Xinhua 2006).   
Though there have been incidents when these groups have chal-
lenged the government, the close relationship these NGOs share with 
the CCP is evident, and the promotion of these groups and official sanc-
tioning of their positions is a way of channelling their influence and lim-
iting or confining their activities. In doing so, the government has by 
default effectively managed NGOs’ communication strategies and has 
confined and shaped environmental discourse. In addition to this, the 
registration process also acts as a filter because it is costly and time-
consuming; however, to avoid bureaucratic red tape and rigorous selec-
tion procedures, many NGOs turn to industrial and commercial admin-
istrative bureaus for registration because the process is easier and quicker 
(Xin 2005). 
Green Riots an Unofficial Discourse 
The promotion of NGOs by the government in the media is generally of 
the “good news” story variety. For instance, the State Environmental 
Protection Administration (SEPA) website mainly covers good news 
stories relating to China’s environment. The CCP showcased their ability 
to clean up the environment as a part of the 2008 Olympics. In July 
2007, the SEPA launched a two-month campaign to clean up the coun-
try’s rivers and recovered 725 million CNY (146 million USD) in fines 
from polluting businesses (Reuters 2007). This clean-up effort is a stark 
contrast to the numerous environmental riots and protests reported by 
the international press. When these stories do appear in the Chinese 
media, they are often reported very differently.   
Small-scale, rural protests are common, and unless they are large 
they do not make it into the national or international press. A report in 
the New York Times in 2005 put the number of protests at 74,000 inci-
dents, up from about 10,000 a decade earlier (French 2005). Environ-
ment-related riots, protests, and disputes in China increased by 30 per 
cent in 2006 to more than 50,000 (Green Clippings 2006). As with many 
stories on China in the international press, they are often initially gener-
ated by the Chinese media. Local press may cover an event which then 
gets picked up by the international media – these stories are then re-
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articulated and re-circulated for a wider audience. This was also the case 
with the Nandan mine disaster and the Jiangxi school explosion in 2001, 
where the stories were first released by local press and then picked up by 
foreign media. The Western press often cast these stories as David ver-
sus Goliath clashes, whereas the Chinese media often cast rioters as hav-
ing been stirred up by a small group of troublemakers. An example of 
this obfuscation occurred in April 2005 when it was estimated that thou-
sands (the reports on the number of rioters vary from 20,000 to 60,000) 
of residents of Huaxi, a town in Dongyang, rioted against police over 
pollution from chemical plants in a nearby industrial park. The residents 
of Huaxi and nearby Huankantao had been complaining about the pollu-
tion and how it affected their health and the productivity of their farms 
for four years prior to the riots. The residents signed petitions and sent 
them to the SEPA, and had sent delegations to the Zhejiang Provincial 
Headquarters in Hangzhou and to Beijing prior to the riot (Cody 2005). 
The local paper Dongyang Daily blamed local agitators for the riot (Yard-
ley 2005). By way of contrast, the New York Times cast the protesters as 
victims of pollution and official corruption (Yardley 2005).   
The Phoenix Weekly, which is available on the Internet, and is a sub-
sidiary of Phoenix TV in Hong Kong (legally received by ordinary 
Mainlanders with access to cable or satellite television), ran extensive 
coverage of the incident which has since been translated by Roland 
Soong of the EastSouthWestNorth blog. According to the translation by 
Soong, the Phoenix Weekly noted conflicting stories within the Mainland 
media that also conflicted with the stories that their journalists were 
picking up on the ground at the riots. Phoenix Weekly stated:  
Although the mainland media were instructed not to report on the 
matter, the incident was rapidly disseminated in Zhejiang. The people 
called it a peasant rebellion, the Hong Kong media called it a ‘large-
scale riot’ but the local government said that ‘the removal of illegal 
structures in Dongyang city was obstructed’ because ‘the desire of the 
citizens for environmental protection was used by a small minority of 
individuals with ulterior motives’ (Phoenix Weekly 2005). 
Soong also claims that much of the coverage of the incident by foreign 
journalists came from Chinese media reports and Internet sources. This 
is due to the fact that journalists were not able to gain access to the area; 
in fact, one foreign correspondent was briefly detained. Access to 
Dongyang was blocked and checkpoints were set up at all of the major 
entrances to the town, making it even more difficult to report on the 




riots. This tactic was also used after the Jiangxi school explosion. The 
residents of Huaxi responded in the same way that the parents did at 
Jiangxi – they turned to the Internet as a means of revealing the story to 
a wider audience. According to Roland Soong, news of the event  
was rapidly transmitted from the local chat rooms, but the local gov-
ernment immediately blocked the chat rooms and other channels. The 
local media were also ordered not to report on this case. Yet, foreign 
media and Hong Kong newspapers were able to report on this inci-
dent through the chat room information sources (Phoenix Weekly 
2005).  
The riots began on the night of 10 April and were discussed in Internet 
forums up until 13 April, when this source of information and discussion 
was shut down and posts deleted.2 Despite this, Western news reports 
claimed victory for the people of Huaxi/ Huankantou as six of the thir-
teen factories were ordered to shut down following the protests, though 
nine residents were arrested (Cody 2005; Ramirez 2006). 
In October 2005, six members of Green Watch were arrested by the 
Public Security Bureau in Hangzhou. Green Watch is an environmental 
group that formed after members monitored the riots in Huaxi. Accord-
ing to the NGO Human Rights in China, one of the members of Green 
Watch, Lai Jinbiao, “was placed under criminal detention from April 12 
until May 11 on the charge of ‘illegally providing intelligence overseas’” 
(Human Rights in China 2005). It can be confidently hypothesised that 
Lai was talking to foreign journalists who had converged on the area to 
cover the story.  
In 2007 I searched the Internet again for information on the riots 
and what had happened in Huaxi, and I did not find much information. 
What remains on the Internet – that is accessible outside of China – are 
stories of the riots in 2005. Searches on official websites such as those of 
the China Daily, Xinhua, and the People’s Daily result in “good news” sto-
ries about the prosperity of the town. 
In terms of the management of official discourse, the CCP deletes 
and blocks stories from the Internet that do not concur with their own 
view of the event. This is a theme that has run throughout the case stud-
ies in this paper: When an event occurs, traditional informational flows 
                                                 
2 Roland Soong translated a number of posts from Chinese Internet forum com-
ments (via Boxun). He cites this as an “example of citizen reporters taking over 
when the mainstream media are missing in action” (Soong 2005).  
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are circumvented and new flows are created through the Internet. In-
formation about these events is managed according to CCP needs, so 
stories are either eliminated or rewritten and used to benefit the CCP’s 
image-building. Events that are seen as a challenge to the authority of the 
CCP are contained and are systematically removed from Chinese cyber-
space, as in the Jiangxi school explosion and the Huaxi/ Huankantao 
riots. At other times, stories have been absorbed by the CCP and used to 
push the party line. The result is that China has, to some extent, built a 
separate Internet – an Internet with alternative histories and journalistic 
accounts of events with material that is different in focus and content 
from the broader World Wide Web. An example of this blatant absence 
of history is that accounts of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre are 
absent from this separate Chinese Internet.   
The CCP has responded quickly to the changes in informational 
flows as a consequence of the Internet. This adaptation to a changing 
environment is consistent with Ronald Deibert’s extension of the ideas 
of Innis in Deibert’s use of Darwin’s theories of evolution as applied to 
changes in communications technology, and his application of medium 
theory. Deibert argues that  
a change in the mode of communication (environment) will ‘favour’ 
certain social forces and ideas (species) by means of functional bias 
towards some and not others, just as natural environment determines 
which species prosper by selecting for certain physical characteristics 
(Deibert 1997: 30). 
By social forces, Deibert means “actual social groups, actors, and various 
forms of social organisation or normative or goal driven social behav-
iour” (1997: 32). My aim here is to extend this and to argue that survival 
of a species in an evolutionary sense is about the adaptation of a species 
to a changing environment. Just as some species are able to adapt and 
change, some social groups are able to adapt and change. It is not so 
much the environment that chooses which species or ideas survive and 
flourish, but rather the ways in which a species or a group adapt to those 
changes. In the case of China, as elsewhere, the government has adapted 
to the changing communications environment. The CCP has been ac-
tively involved in shaping that environment through the strategies that 
they employ to manage the Internet, which include the management of 
code as a means of censorship, the construction of a legal framework, 
and the development of content. In the end, the Internet is a tool that 
both facilitates change and can be shaped and modified by those who 




use it. It is because of this that it is more important to look at what people 
do with the technology rather than the technology itself.  
The management of the Huaxi/ Huankantao riots also highlights 
the negotiation of centre–margin relationships between Beijing at the 
centre and officials in Zhejiang province at the margins, as well as cen-
tre-margin relationships in Zhejiang between Hangzhou, the provincial 
capital, and the Dongyang officials at the margins. Goodman and Segal 
argue that this negotiation of regionalism is a consequence of the Open 
Door policy. Goodman and Segal (1994: 13) argue that “the centre lays 
down the broad outline of a policy, with the provinces adopting specific 
local measures for implementation”. In the case of the Huaxi/ Huankan-
tao riots, the Internet provided a window through which the central 
government was more able to closely observe what was going on at the 
margins, thus reinforcing the authority of the centre. Traditional modes 
of communication allowed provincial officials to cover up facts and paint 
a picture of what Beijing “at the centre” wanted. For example, the fam-
ine that was a consequence of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s is 
largely seen as a result of poor central planning and the policies of the 
campaign. Food shortages were exacerbated by the boastful claims about 
grain output that were exaggerated at every level of government in order 
to paint a picture of success for the benefit of the central government 
(see Wei and Tao 2005). This has also contributed to the perception that 
official figures in China are notoriously unreliable.  
As previously mentioned, the environment has been identified by 
the government as one of the most serious issues facing the stability of 
the country. In response to this impending crisis, there have been ex-
periments with new forms of public participation so as to avoid riots like 
those in Huaxi/ Huankantao. The Xiamen PX (paraxylene) plant in Fu-
jian is a good example of this, and is being hailed as a victory for the 
power of the people in the PRC (see Soong 2007). In 2007 construction 
began on the plant, and by May, residents of the area were complaining 
that it was already giving off an industrial odour. A mass protest was 
organised via mobile phone text messages (see Figure 1). News of the 
event spread across the Internet via social websites such as Twitter, 
Flickr, and MySpace, and it also emerged as an issue on blogs and other 
forums. Zoula, also known as the first citizen reporter, descended on 
Xiamen to cover the story on his blog and website. As is often the case, 
as the story grew, the local press stopped covering the story, however 
coverage of the story was allowed to continue nationally. A columnist for 
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the Southern Weekend, Lian Yue, wrote at length about the issue on his 
blog. He also suggested that Xiamen residents start websites (Asia 
Sentinal 2007).  
Figure 1: SMS Danger Warning 
 
Note: The following translation comes from the China.org website run by the State Coun-
cil: “The Taiwan-funded Xianglu Group has begun building a PX plant. It’s like an 
atomic bomb in Xiamen”. 
Source: China.org 2008. 
Many people will suffer leukaemia and more babies will be born with 
congenital defects. A paraxylene project should be at least 100 kilome-
tres from a major urban settlement, but we are only 16 km from the 
project. For the sake of our future generations, please forward the 
message to all your friends (China.org 2008).  
The end of the message calls for people to protest on the streets on 1 
June. 
An estimated 8,000 to 10,000 people took to the streets on 1 June to 
protest against the plant. The Xiamen press followed the familiar pattern 
of blaming an individual or a small group of agitators for the unrest. An 
editorial published in the Xiamen Daily claimed that the government and 
most citizens had Xiamen’s best interests at heart. The editorial identi-
fied XiamenWave22 as a troublemaker who wrote an SMS that was stir-
ring up trouble. The editorial said that XiamenWave22 was “misleading 
the public and provoking hostility between the government and the 
masses” (Asia Sentinal 2007).  




In an unusual twist, the project was stalled by the government on 7 
June, a week after the street marches, when the government put a hold 
on the project pending an environmental assessment and public consul-
tation. This action was unprecedented and represented a form of ex-
perimentation with public participation. On 27 December there was an 
announcement that the project would be moved and that the provincial 
government would compensate the plant’s owners.  
The new forms of experimentation with public participation follow 
from the Seventeenth National Party Congress, during which Chinese 
President Hu Jintao called for the expansion of socialist democracy. Hu 
(2007b) argued China needed to   
expand socialist democracy and better safeguard the people’s rights 
and interests as well as social equity and justice. Citizens’ participation 
in political affairs will expand in an orderly way. The rule of law will 
be carried out more thoroughly as a fundamental principle, public 
awareness of law will be further enhanced, and fresh progress will be 
made in government administration based on the rule of law. Pri-
mary-level democracy will be improved. The government will mark-
edly enhance its capability of providing basic public services (Hu 
2007b). 
The way the protests over the Xiamen PX plant were portrayed in the 
media is a visualisation, via text and images in the media, of public opin-
ion and of how centre-margin relationships are negotiated on the Inter-
net. These groups do not necessarily speak to one another directly; they 
do so via the media. In this instance, the CCP allowed the expression of 
public opinion to drive the outcome of the project. If they had wanted 
silence the protestors and forge ahead with the plans for the plant, they 
would have done so, just like they did in Huaxi. If the authorities want to 
close down chat rooms and BBSs, they can; if they want to delete blogs 
and stop people posting, they can. If the CCP chooses not to block and 
delete postings it is probably because they are showing an emerging un-
derstanding that “spin”-type management usually has more positive and 
fewer negative consequences.  
HIV/ AIDS 
The unreliability of official figures in China on the number of HIV/ 
AIDS sufferers makes it difficult to get an accurate picture of the extent 
of the problem. The first case was reported in 1985 and the disease has 
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spread rapidly since that time. In 2005 a joint study by the Ministry of 
Health, the World Health Organization and United Nations AIDS 
(UNAIDS) put the number of people living with the virus at 650,000, of 
whom 75,000 had developed full-blown AIDS (Wang Zhiyong 2007). In 
2006 the number of infections reported was 183,733 and it was said this 
was up 30 per cent from the previous year. In another report in 2007, the 
number of people infected with the virus was put at 214,300 with 56,758 
having full-blown AIDS (Wang Hongjiang 2007). An official report re-
leased prior to World AIDS Day on 1 December 2007 said that  
China officially reported 223,501 HIV contracted cases, including 
62,838 AIDS patients, by October 2007 while about 700,000 people 
are estimated to be living with HIV/ AIDS (China Daily 2007a). 
In the news reports that I researched for this paper there also seemed to 
be a time lag in the figure-reporting. For instance, several of the official 
CCP news stories from 2007 used figures from 2005. Despite the inaccu-
racies in the figures, the CCP has encouraged the development of NGOs 
to address the epidemic. 
The CCP’s rhetoric on the fight against HIV/ AIDS is as contradic-
tory as its management of the environment and the Internet. On the one 
hand, the government promotes the development of NGOs to help 
tackle the epidemic, but at the same time the government attempts to 
silence other groups when it comes to the issues of HIV/ AIDS. The 
aim is to control debate within the confines of an official version of the 
outbreak of HIV/ AIDS and its management. The official version in-
cludes the acknowledgement of the problem of HIV/ AIDS to some 
degree, and through the use of the media and NGOs, the government is 
trying to convey that the epidemic is being addressed and well managed. 
NGOs are bounded by regulation and the need for government support 
in order to exist and this in turn affects the way they operate.  
As in the case of environmental NGOs, there are hundreds of 
HIV/ AIDS NGOs and very few of them are recognised by the gov-
ernment; consequently, few are funded by the government. For example, 
in 2007 the central government announced an alliance with certain HIV/ 
AIDS NGOs to assist in the fight against the disease. The Chinese Asso-
ciation of Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS Prevention and Con-
trol will oversee the alliance as well as integrate and coordinate the par-
ticipation of Chinese and international NGOs (China.org 2007a). This 
new system is similar to the integration of environmental groups, and 
centralises the management of NGOs.  




In the run up to World AIDS Day in 2007, the central government 
launched a new campaign to combat the spread of the virus and to curb 
the prejudice aimed at those who suffer from the disease. The campaign 
included a series of television commercials featuring Jackie Chan. Pre-
mier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao both made public appearances 
to promote AIDS awareness, which was consistent with Western PR 
practices, i.e. the photo opportunity. Premier Wen has been making the 
photo opportunity pilgrimage to Henan province every year since 2003. 
During these trips, the premier visits orphanages and reiterates the cen-
tral government’s position and policy on health care, which is the provi-
sion of free medicine and doctor’s consultations to people infected with 
the virus, and free education for children orphaned by AIDS. Hu Jintao 
also visited communities and doctors in northern Beijing as part of 
World AIDS Day. Both Hu and Wen were using these visits to promote 
awareness about the virus and to address the prejudice against those with 
the virus (China Daily 2007a). These visits are tightly controlled by both 
central and provincial authorities who hold their own “shows”: one for 
the world, one for the central government, and one for the people.  
As is often the case, there is a gap between central policy and re-
gional implementation. According to the Washington Post, provincial hos-
pitals fail to run the correct tests to reveal the virus, or they purposely 
misdiagnose the virus in order to cover up the extent of the problem, 
and this has been exacerbated by corruption (Fan 2007). Regional differ-
ences are also reflected in the different modes of transmission of the 
virus. This is due in part to regional economic conditions and issues that 
have arisen from the open-market economy. For instance, in central 
China the main mode of infection has been through the collection and 
transfusion of blood products. In coastal cities the virus has been spread 
through prostitution, and in western China through prostitution and 
intravenous drug use (Ma 2005: 133). Nationally, though, in 2005 unsafe 
sex was cited as the main mode of transmission (China Daily 2007b). The 
number of reported cases varies from region to region and this is re-
flected in the diverse attitudes to the management and prevention of the 
disease in different provinces (Bezlova 2005).  
One of the most tragic cases of mismanagement and corruption in-
volved the medically acquired infection of thousands of rural peasants in 
Henan, which also serves to illustrate the tensions in centre-margin rela-
tionships. In the 1990s, officials in Henan, one of the poorest provinces, 
encouraged peasants to supplement their income through the sale of 
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their blood. At the time, there was no screening for disease, and blood 
was often collected in unhygienic conditions which led to the rapid 
spread of the virus. In some cases this was exacerbated by attempts to 
prevent anaemia through the practice of injecting regular donors with 
unscreened red cells extracted from the valuable plasma (Human Rights 
Watch 2006). In 2001 the scandal broke nationally and the central gov-
ernment responded by ordering the collection clinics to be phased out 
and the screening and regulation of blood products be tightened. How-
ever, the practice continued and there are still occasional reports about 
illegal blood clinics. In June 2007 a new campaign was launched in cen-
tral China to crack down on the practice (China.org 2007b).  
It is not clear how many people were infected as a result of this 
practice; however, official figures from 2006 put the number at 35,232 
reported HIV carriers, including 21,828 with AIDS (Human Rights 
Watch 2006; China.org 2007c). The effect has been devastating and in 
some instances has wiped out entire villages and left thousands of chil-
dren orphaned and abandoned by their extended families and the 
broader community (Human Rights Watch 2006). The situation in He-
nan is comparable to the hardest hit communities in Africa, and it is the 
worst affected area in Asia (Beyrer and Csete 2003).  
The mismanagement and corruption of blood collection practices is 
not confined to Henan, and the pattern of neglect of AIDS victims along 
with the denial of the problem are reflected in other parts of the country. 
The epidemic is not seen as a national tragedy but an economic problem 
and a major source of embarrassment for the government. This case B 
highlights the negotiation of spatial relationships between Beijing at the 
centre and provincial governments at the margins. Beyrer and Csete 
argue that  
China’s stalled responses to the outbreak, and its treatment of those 
few courageous citizens who have exposed it, reflect the state of civil 
society, rule of law, rights of citizens, and emerging center-periphery 
dynamics of the new China (Beyrer and Csete 2003).  
Government officials in Henan were actively involved in trying to cover 
up the tragedy, and this is also a feature of the SARS outbreak. There 
were also reports that courts in Henan had refused to hear compensation 
cases of those infected. Human Rights Watch said that the “Health Min-
ister Gao Qiang was quoted in the international press as saying that the 
courts should admit those cases and make fair judgments” (Human 
Rights Watch 2006). In another incident in 2006, the New York-based 




Human Rights Watch claimed that numerous sufferers of HIV/ AIDS in 
Henan were placed under house arrest to stop them from petitioning the 
National People’s Congress, in order to prevent them from seeking re-
dress from the government after being infected by tainted blood prod-
ucts. Corruption also became a feature of centre-margin relationships 
when local officials were arrested and others sacked for the theft of aid 
from the central government and private donors in 2006.  
The Henan provincial government has also gone to great lengths to 
contain the activities of high-profile activists. Dr Yaojie Gao, an interna-
tionally acclaimed gynaecologist, first brought the scandal of Henan to 
light after her lengthy investigation into the number of people presenting 
to her with symptoms of the virus. Dr Gao used her own funds to treat 
people with the virus and has often been threatened and harassed for her 
work with victims of the virus. Her attempts to uncover the extent of the 
crisis were thwarted by local officials who told her to stop what she was 
doing. Furthermore, she was prevented from visiting villages. The cam-
paign against her was stepped up when her children lost their jobs. When 
Dr Gao tried to take her findings to Beijing, she was detained by authori-
ties in Henan. Dr Gao was named a “Model Citizen” by the Ministry of 
Education in Beijing in 1999 but was prevented from being able to pick 
up the award by Henan authorities. In August 2002 she was interviewed 
by China Newsweekly about her work, an interview which was reprinted in 
other publications. Following the publication of the interview, Henan 
provincial officials ordered her not to talk with journalists ever again 
(Gao 2001). Her story and findings were eventually taken up by the in-
ternational media when a Beijing-based journalist for the New York Times 
covered her story and that of the victims of Henan (Beyrer and Csete 
2003).  
Dr Gao was awarded the Jonathan Mann Award for Health and 
Human Rights by the Global Health Council in 2001, and the Ramon 
Magsaysay Award for Public Service in 2003, but was denied the right to 
travel to receive her awards. China Central Television designated her as 
one of “Ten People Who Touched China in 2003”. There has been an 
outcry from the international community over Dr Gao’s treatment, and 
she was eventually given permission to travel to the United States in 
2007 to receive an honour bestowed upon her by the Vital Voices 
Global Partnership, a non-profit organisation. (Initially she was denied 
permission to travel but this was later revoked.) As Beyrer and Csete 
point out, it appears that under international pressure, Beijing ordered 
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the Henan government to “ease its threats and harassment”. When asked 
why the Chinese communist government did not want her to travel to 
the United States to receive awards, she answered, “They’re afraid that I 
will expose the fact that (illegal) blood-selling is the main reason for the 
AIDS epidemic in China” (Sun and Tian 2007).  
In a situation that seems to have changed direction, Peter Piot, Di-
rector of UNAIDS, went to China in July 2007 to meet with Dr Gao in 
Henan and to visit families affected by the virus. Dr Gao was also visited 
by Henan officials as part of a photo story for local papers during Chi-
nese New Year celebrations, even though she was under house arrest 
and was being prevented from travelling overseas (Yardley 2007). Dr 
Gao and her story have been absorbed into the central government’s 
version of the AIDS epidemic, and their attempts to use her for their 
own propaganda confirm this. In July 2007 the government admitted 
that illegal and unhygienic blood-collection practices in Henan are the 
main cause of HIV/ AIDS in the province. However, they still cite other 
reasons such as unprotected sex with foreigners and prostitution in other 
provinces (China.org 2007c).  
There are definite tensions between Beijing at the centre and Henan 
at the margins, but the extent to which Beijing is in control or has a clear 
stance on Dr Gao is unclear. Despite the apparent backing down, Dr 
Gao was still effectively under house arrest until 2009 when she left 
China for the USA, where she now lives in exile and will not return for 
fears regarding her safety. However her blog remains; it is still hosted by 
SINA (China’s largest portal) and was still accessible as of September 
2010 – her last entry was made in 2009. The blog could easily be shut 
down if Beijing wanted it that way, and the fact of the house arrest com-
bined with the permission to keep blogging suggest a lack of consensus 
between the provincial and the central governments on how to deal with 
Gao and what she represents.  
Other prominent HIV/ AIDS activists such as Hu Jia, Zeng Jinyan, 
and Wan Yanhai have been treated in a similar way. Wan, the founder of 
the grassroots organisation AiZhi (? love and ? knowledge), was ar-
rested in August 2002 for posting “illegally acquired interior classified 
documents of relevant state departments to overseas individuals [and/or] 
media sources” on a website (China.org 2002). Wan was released after 
confessing his crimes and after intense international pressure (Beyrer and 
Csete 2003; Ma 2005). In an interview following his release, Wan said 
that  




AIDS became an ideological weapon to attack Western culture. The 
media didn’t talk much about AIDS in the 1980s—at least not AIDS 
in China. There was no limit to talking about AIDS internationally, 
but the media kept silent on AIDS domestically (Rosenberg 2003). 
In one of China’s most famous cases, Zeng Jinyan and her husband Hu 
Jia, environmental and AIDS activists, were detained by Chinese authori-
ties in Beijing and spent 214 days under house arrest between August 
2006 and March 2007 without any legal proceedings. Hu had been post-
ing information on his website and blog about dissident and peasant 
protests. Zeng told their story in a blog that detailed their surveillance by 
secret police and her husband’s disappearance. Naturally her blog was 
blocked but she continued to blog via email on a blog site outside of 
China. This occurred despite her Internet connection being regularly cut 
(Bristow 2007). In September 2007 the couple won the Sakharov Prize, a 
human rights award given out by the European Parliament. In the same 
year, Time also named Zeng one of the world’s 100 most influential people. 
The couple have also turned their detention and surveillance into a 
documentary called Prisoners of Freedom City, and when they attempted to 
leave China in May 2007 to show the film overseas, they were detained 
and placed under house arrest once again. The documentary is available 
on YouTube outside of China.  
On 27 December 2007 Hu Jia was arrested, and Zeng and their two-
month-old baby were placed under house arrest. The only visitors she 
has been allowed are their parents. Hu’s lawyers have been prevented 
from seeing him because his case is said to involve “state secrets”. 
Threats have also been made to take the baby away in between feedings, 
and friends and supporters of the couple have been prevented from 
delivering baby formula to Zeng; some friends have even been taken in 
for questioning, according to Radio Free Asia (Mudie and Chen 2008). 
Bloggers have come out in support of Hu and Zeng and there is an 
online petition calling for Hu’s immediate release. It is quite feasible that 
Hu and references to him can be erased from the Internet using techno-
logical means. In the Western media, Hu’s arrest was tied to a pre-
Olympics crackdown on dissident activities. Radio Free Asia also reported 
that Dr Gao’s family has been threatened and harassed, that her e-mail 
has been blocked, and that her phone has been tapped (Mudie and Chen 
2008).  
All three cases and the way they played out in the international me-
dia and on the Internet are also a visualisation, via text and images in the 
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media, of the negotiation of centre-margin relationships between Beijing 
and the international community. These cases also highlight the tensions 
in those relationships and the contradictory nature of the way in which 
the Internet and its impact on the management of information can be 
viewed. A case can be made for either an emerging democracy or further 
authoritarian oppression. The gaps and contradictions evident in some 
of the case studies also allude to differences in the party at different 
levels.  
Conclusion 
NGOs represent an official voice: As they have been sanctioned by the 
CCP, they are regulated and registered. Then there is the unofficial voice 
– this includes individuals who post videos of China’s pollution on You-
Tube for the world to see, and riots that are reported in the international 
press. The rioters and the YouTube posters are often there in response 
to an event or a crisis, as was evident in the cases of the mine disasters 
and the SARS epidemic. They become events in a broader sense when 
they hit the Internet and then become staged events when the govern-
ment begins to mount their response. Even a riot, though spontaneous, 
is a constructed event, albeit a chaotic one. A riot is still a form of pro-
test. In addition, the way local officials handle these things has come 
under increasing scrutiny from the central government in Beijing, and 
the Huaxi/ Huankantao riots bear this out. The management and har-
assment of HIV/ AIDS activists has been played out on the interna-
tional stage through the Internet to some extent, because to some degree 
international relations are played out in the media through press state-
ments, interviews, and events. In the end, though, what all of these case 
studies reveal is that in order to understand the effect of the medium of 
communication, we must look at the context in which people are using it 
and how authorities manage that use. The ways in which authorities 
manage information flows need further contextualisation in relation to 
issues such as environmental degradation, the AIDS epidemic, and the 
image China wishes to present to the world. In addition, the increasing 
pressure from the international community over issues such as Beijing’s 
involvement in Darfur and the handling of the situation in Tibet are also 
having an impact on the way in which information is managed and pub-
lic discourse is shaped in China.  
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